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A View on the Philosophy of Music 
Jul ifl n Manades Millet 
Philosophy of music is a second-level reflection on Ihe nature of music 
and our experience of it. Music is a pract ice fraught with meaning ilnd value 
in the lives of many people and occupies an important place in our artistic 
cu lnlre. I-I owever, it raises philosopltica l queslions perhaps more difficult 
than other artistic practices. Many philosophers, from Pythagoreans and P[alo 
10 Willgenstcin and Adomo, have been attracted by these issues, and their 
doctrines arc part of the h;.ffOlY of the philosophy of music. 
I f wc limit ourselves 10 the major lopics Ihat have been the focus or dis-
cussion in recent decades, we Cfln group such topics into al lCflst six main nreas: 
(a) mefllOdologiclI/ issues concemi ng research on Ihe philosophy of mu-
sic (the debate on the delinition of music; the choice of a theoretical 
framework to deal with the analysis of musicality; the diITerence be-
tween noises, sounds and tones; the debate between objectivism and 
subjectivism about musical phenomena; the opposition between 
' pure' and 'impure' music, etc.); 
(b) issues relat ing to the oll/ology of music Ohe clash between nominal-
ism and idea lism regarding the relationship between a musical 
'work' and its tokcns or 'performanccs'; the eontl'Oversy between 
fic tionalism and realism, etc.); 
(c) topics conceming the aeslhef;cs of music (the basic properties of 
music; funcionulisl vs. cultural isl theories; the distinction between 
'pure' and 'impure' music); 
(d) issues regarding the sell/oll/ics of music (the semiotics of musical 
meaning; the link between music and text; the distinction bctween 
stmcnlre and content; the controversy between representut ionalislll, 
expressivism and fonnnlism, etc.); 
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(e) topics regarding the no/we of lIIusical e).]Je/"icl1ce (psychological. 
cognitive and moral aspects of musica l experience; musical expres-
siveness; skills and behavioural responses involved in musica l un-
derstanding, etc.); 
(f) issues conccllling the I'a/lle ofmllsic (what makes musical experi-
ence valuable; what connections can be established between music 
and mysticism, between music und ineffability, between music and 
noise; between music and si lence, etc.). 
This special issue of teon:lDm consists of un open collection of contributions 
to be regarded liS a good sample of Ihe kind of questions that ore researched 
and discussed in the phi losophy of music at present. 
T he papers by V 'TOR GUllRREJRO, JOHN W. LANGQ and ANDREA 
SCHlAVIO belong to IIn llrea or rcscllrch concerning the nature o r music (a). 
All three articles mise the question whether it is userulto have a precise defi· 
nit ion or music, and introduce dirrerent arguments 10 rellch conclusions that 
are varied and, in certain respects, incompatible with onc another. 
In his art icle "Thinking Ctearly about Music", Vitor Guerreiro dcuts 
with the question ' what is music?' from a methodological rather than an on· 
tologiclIl standpoint, since his pU1VOSC is not to provide a new defini tion of 
music, but to investigate wtmt ki nd or philosophicallheory would be suilllblc 
for doing so. Even though Gucrrei ro considers the definition of music to be 
an independent matler from the definition of 11 1'1, he lLses Dickie's distinction 
between 11(IIIIra/·killd ,heories of an (according to which art arises from mltu-
ral activities) whose creation is the resu lt of the natural behavior, und clIl-
lura/·killd theories of (lrl (according to which institutional structures ure the 
necessary and sufficient condit ions for artworks), in order to provide a natu-
ral-kind theory of ill1 which is nevcl1heless cnriched with elements from the 
instiMional theory. The purpose of such a theory, which would include fu nc-
tions based both on physical Sh'lJctures and on collective representations, 
would be to provide a definition of 'sonorous a11' rol' both possible and actual 
sonorous activities with social, but not necessarily aesthetic functions. One 
such definition would cover: a) (';ore instances of mu si ea I works arising from 
the intent ional instantiation of basic musical propel1ies such as harmony, 
rhythm or melody, by means of sounds; b) derived instances of music (i.e., 
events lacking any of these basic lllusical propC11ies. but having a certain Illusi· 
cal status bct:ause of their rappol1 wit h those propeI1ies); c) non-musical sono· 
rous artworks, such as sonorous poetry; d) instances of nOlHu1islie music, such 
as sonorous activities with social, but not necessarily aesthetic, funct ions. 
In his al1 icle "Why can Sounds be Structured as Music?", John W. 
Lango considers the nature of music at a basic level, since his intention is not 
merely to define the nature of music in terms of stnlchLred sounds, but mlher 
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10 ask about the basis of the fact that sounds can be stmclurcd as music. The 
main thesis of the articlc is th,lI in order for sounds to be stmcntred as music, 
initially by the composer and then by the perfonncrs. they must be intrinsi-
cally stmcturcd. Adopting a standpoint both phcllomcnologicaland ontologi-
cal, according to which sounds are not mere physical or physiological entities 
but rather phenomena , not pure events bUI rather time-fmmed processes, 
Lango defincs sound as a mere bundle of acoustic propel1ies, and musical 
sound as bundle of propelties such as pitch and timbre. Or, more precisely, a 
sound is a bundle of tropes of acoustic properties, where a trope is an instan-
tiation of certain properties and relntions. Such acoustic tropes arc the I)ri-
mary constituents of musical sounds or tones. Lango nrgucs that this notion 
ofa sound - and a tone - is compatible with both realist and nominal isl onto-
logica l theories. But the main question addressed by Lango is not what 
sounds are, but how it is that they can be structured as music. Work ing under 
thc assumption that what wc actually hear is not It chaotic multiplici ty of so-
norous impressions, the answer given by the article is that sounds can be 
heard as lllusic because they are instantiations of relations between intrinsi-
ca ll y structured acoustic properties. This phenomelogical thesis stands op-
posed to two different kinds of rcduclionism: onc according to which 
acoustic relations are reducible 10 acoustic qualities, and another according to 
which acoustic qualities arc reducible to magni tudes. 
Andrea Schiavio's 31ticie "Constituting the Musicul Object it Neuro-
phenomenological Perspeclive on Musiclll Research" suggests an alternative 
to two current researeh strategies to distinguish between the objective and 
subjective aspects of musicality. Aga inst both the analysis of standard musi-
cology, whose field of snldy are the objcctive fcatures of musical mMerials, 
and certain trends in the psychology of music, interested only in the neural 
cOlTelales of specific musical ski lls, Schiavio claims that the relation bctwcen 
music and audience/perfonner is an insepnrable feature in evely musica l ex-
perience, and argues that only It genuine colluboration between phcnomenol-
ogy and neuroscience can produce adequate knowledge of music as un 
intentional object. The article applies Husscl"l's analysis of the ability to make 
sense to the constin.ttion of musical objects, and argucs that this ubil ity mani-
fests itself in the active capacity of the body, re-defined on the basis of neuro-
pllysiological evidence in tenus of the human motor system. The al1icle 
establishes that, within Ihis approach to the intentionality of musiclll experi-
ence, no definition of music is needed, regardless of the nature of the defi ni-
tion: either strict and explicit, or implicit and unproblematic. 
The following three papers dcal with different topics in the ontology of 
music (b). A problem for the consideration of music as an art, although not 
the only one, is the ambiguity inheJ"ent to the notion of 'work ' , when apl)licd 
to music. On the one halld, we take a musical work 10 be something the au-
thor compose.o; and êÉgácá íÉêKú= in the score shcet but, on the other hand, it i:i ub-
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..,jous as well that music is not the notes written down 011 the score sheet, but 
the sonorous performance of the notes, usually by pcrfonncrs other than Ihe 
composer himself. Emphasizing the composition aspect of the music .. ! work 
implies considering music as a lext, while highlighting its pclfonllance in-
volves considering music primarily as a practice. This duality bl'jngs up such 
philosophic:.1 questions as: what is the ontological nature or lhe written and the 
performed musical work? How clIn the relation between them be categorized? 
What is the role of interpretation as nn intemlcd iary between the score and its 
perfomlancc'! STEPIiEN DAVIES, JONATHAN N EUFELD and ALESSANDRO BERT1-
NElTO deal in their m1iclcs with difTercm aspects of musical performance, in-
cluding both the kind of interpretation carried oUl by the perfollncr, and the 
performances called "improvisations", which arc fairly independent of the score. 
lonathan Ncufcld, in his article "Critical Performances", begins with a 
very common dis tinction in the literature between critical and perfonnative 
interpretations. According to Wollheirn, who established the distinction , a 
pelfol'lnative interpretation is an expression of a critical interpretation of the 
musical work by its perfonner, so there is a correspondence between thcm. 
Levinson, in his anicle "Pcrfonnativc ven;us Cri tica l Interpretation in Music" 
(1996] , conccdes in turn that performers interprct, butargucs that thcir inter-
pretations arc csentially different from, and logically independent of, critical 
interpretutions, and upholds the thesis of the indiscern ibili ty of pelfollnali ve 
interpretations with regard to those performances with indiscernibl e sonorous 
structures._A main goal of Neufcld 's article is to discuss this thesis, arguing 
that performances indiscernible from a sonorous point of view may express 
different performati ve interpretations. Neufcld appeals to different examplcs 
of public critici sm taken from the modem tradition, to show that to the extcnt 
to which a musical performance is an intentional act based on reflective 
choices expressed in sonorous structures, musical performance conta ins a 
critical aspect which reveals itself ill the autholity exerted on the audience 
when the performance cstabljshes a particular direction to listen to the musi-
cal work. The conclusion offhe art icle is that accounting for performative in-
terpretation in terms of authority and pm1icipation, pavcs the way for an 
explanation o f crit ical pcrfonnances that contributes to an understanding not 
only of individual musical works, but of musical practice as a who le. 
The leitmotiv of Stephell Davies ' al1icle "Authentic Perfonnances o f 
Musical Works" is the analysis of the notion and value of an authentic per-
fo nnance of a musical work. Dnvies focuses his analysis on the pcrfonnance 
of musical works written down on scores, containing the composer's pre-
scriptions for potenti:.l perfonllCfs of the piece. In this sensc, the notion of 
authenticity refe rs to the relation between performance and prescriptions, not 
to the attempt to recreate in the performance panicular aesthetic effects 
sought by the composer. Dnvies dubs "ideally authentic" a pcrfonl1;lIlce that 
accurately IIccomplishes all the instnlclions specified by the author, and 
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maintains that 10 the extent that we are interested in pcrfonnances because of 
the mllsical works they implement - not only because of their virtuosity or 
interpretative interest -, the search for authenTicity is 8 requisite, and not an 
interpretative choice. Davies examines some possible objections to his 'li ter-
alist' position, particularly Peter Kivy's thesis according to which an authen-
tic perfomlance is onc that reneets, not what the composer wrote originally, 
but what he would wish if his musical work was to be performed lit present. 
The articl e concludes with some brief' remarks on the limited va lue of inter-
pretati ve authenticity, under the assumption that authenticity is not the only 
or even a decisive virtue of musical pcrfommncc. 
Thc aim of Alessandro Bel1inetlo's anicle "Pllganini does not Repeal. 
Musical Improvisation and the Typcffoken Ontology" is to ex plore the on-
lology ofa pm1icular kind of musical performance: improvisations. 11le most 
simple notion of improvisation highlights the coincidence of the composing 
and performing processes - in so far as the crention of sounds and si lcnces is 
simultaneously composition Ilnd perfo mlance - , as well as its ephemeral and 
unrepeatable nature. Nonetheless, the firs t section of the article examines a 
more complex notion, onc Ihat distinguishes between improvisat ion as a 
process and improvisation as a result. As a process, an improvisntion is 
unique, but the perfonner can use the invent ions of an improvisation as a col-
lection of prescriptions for subsequent improvisations. In tnis case, tbe result 
of the process can be mcmorized, transcribed, repeated or cOITCCled. This is 
why an improvisation can bc defined as a perfonnance led by the decisions of 
the perfolmer prior!O the event (Kania). The di stinction belween process and 
result may suggest that the ontological type/token duality, widely used in the 
ontology of music to explain the usual case of musical works composed with 
mul tiple performances in view (it is a common thesis that a musical work is a 
type, whereas performances are tokens) might be a suitable tool to explain 
the ontology of improv isllt ion. Thus the improvisation-quu-event would be 
the type - as it were, the composition ,and subsequent pel'fonnances based 
0 11 the evcnt - i.e., the result - could be considered as tokens. BCl'tineHo ex-
amines this account in the central sections of his article, and argues thut the 
type/token distinction cannot be applied to improvisations because of their 
singularity. In so f'ar as an improvisation is created whi le perfonncd, it is an 
Ullrcpeteable process and its spatia-temporal coordinates are pal1 of ils iden· 
ti ty. In ot hcr words, in an improvisation the process is the product: it is not 
only the music produced thm interest us, but also the decisions llnd IIctions 01' 
the pelfonners as they play thc music. However, Beninetto does not alto-
gether reject the Iype/token distinction in the ontology of improvisation. 
Thus, on the basis of the type/token distinction, the last sections of the 1II1icle 
trace interesting connect ions between áméêovásúlíáon=and ccrtain musical pmc-
tices (cover songs, recordings, plllybacks, and so on.). 
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The articles presented so far deal with d ifferent topics, but they all fo-
cus on aspects inherent 10 music, considered as an object wilh a specific iden-
ti ty, regardless of the effects music 1105 on the uudiencc. This cOImection 
between pcnorming and listening can be found, olle way or another, in the 
remaining articles, covering a variety of themes from various perspectives, 
JERROLD LEVINSON'S 311icle " Musical Beauty" is a good example of 
ph ilosophical llnalysis in the aesthetics of music (c). I-l is aim is to examine an 
,aesthetic property of music, musical beauty, in order to o ITer a specific or 
sh'icl characlclizalion. To that effect, he uses a multi-faceted strategy includ-
ing: a) a distinction, allowi ng for vague boundaries, betwcen the concept of 
mus ical bcauty and other concepts with which it may have some kind of logi-
calor semantic connection (inclusion, exclusion, opposition, si mi larity, and 
so on); b) the use of examples to illustrate thc conccpt of ;beautiful music', in 
opposition to examples of mus ic lacking this quality; and c) a comparison be-
tween examples of beautifu l mus ic and examples of bcautiful pai nti ngs. In 
this way, Levllson expects to achievc the following two goa ls: first , to dis-
tinguish betwccn bea utiful musical works (in his strict sensc) and those wi th 
othcr qualities di !ferent from bcauty, either qualitics with somc son of excel-
lence (subl imc music, powerful music, disturbing music, und so on) or with-
oUl it (nice music, enjoyable music, pl eusa nt music, and so on); second, to 
characterize the hallmark of beautiful music as its capacity to move us, pro-
viding us with the gratifying pleasure of feeling, in some way, disamlcd, to 
which the cltistence of celtain stnlctured fea tures and somc degree of unex-
pected novelty contribute. Levison turns to Thomas Mann's Doklor Pal/sIllS 
to introduce, within the category of beautiful music, u distinction between in-
tellectual and sensual beauty. Whereas un imcllectually beaut ifu l work, such 
as Bach 's Goldberg VlIrialiolls, munagcs 10 capt ivate us by means of its me-
lodi c and hamlOnic shape alone. a sensua lly beautiful work sueh as Dc-
bussy's Prelude (i I'apres-midi d'lIlI fillme, uscs tona l and emotional colour, 
The urticle concludes whh some thoughts emphasizing the special value of 
beautiful music as compensat ion and momentllry eomfOlt for the imperfec-
tion and conti ngency of the world. 
SARA Er..L..EN ECKERSON'S and EUSA NEGRElTO'S essays deal with ques-
tions in musical semantics (d), irlcntifying some of the elements thnt contribute 
to give a musical work the meaning it has for ils audience while perfonned. 
The aim of the anicle "Contrarianism in the Philosophy of Music Ilnd 
the Role of the Idea in Musical Hcnnencutics and Performance Interprcta-
tion" is to examine thc role of the interpretation of a musical work in deter-
mining its meaning. Sara E. Eckerson stal1s from the d is tinction between two 
different types of interpretation: crit ical imerprctation of a musical work 
within u specific hemleneutic tradition, and interpretation as a musica l per-
formance. A crucial point of the lu1icle is to argue that, regard less of the radi-
cal diffcrences between Thcm, these two types of interprctation arc not 
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necessarily irreconcilable, and bOlh arc offered to the audience to counteract 
the influence of uneducated or ill-infOl1l1ed opi nions and UHitudes concemi ng 
the understanding of musical works. Eckerson's argument rests mainl y on the 
analysis of two specific examples. The first refers to the way in wh ich Wug-
ner suggests Becthoven's 9th symphony should be listened to. This proposal 
appeared both in the programme of a concel1 Wagner conducted in Dresden 
in 1846. and in the actuul performance he conducted. In the text of Ihe pro-
gramme. Wagner g ives an intcrpretation of the movements of the symphony 
in tenl1S of images and moods inspired in some o f Goet he's texts. Eckerson 
points out that this kind of connection bctween music and poetry shows the 
influenec on Wagner o f Hegel's thesis ubout thc vaguencs .. ú=nf /he meaning of 
instrumcntal music, and consequently the uscfu lness of a text ill order to ex-
plain to thc audience the idea or poetic contcnt Ihnt the musica l work en-
closes. Nevertheless, the importance of the text, according to Wagner, is to 
lead the audience to capture the idea or poetic content of the musical work 
during its performance. In other words, a crit ical interpretation is aimed at the 
musical interpretat ion as perfonmmce and subordinated to it. iJI the second 
pal1 of her al1iclc, Eckerson contrasts Wagner's critical interpretation with 
K..icrkcgaard's analysis of Mozart's operas. Her intention is to show tha t, de-
spite thc different conceptions Wagner and Kicrkegaard have of the nature of 
thc content or idea cxpressed by a musical work, they coincide on the Ihesis 
that an explanation through hermeneutical ana lysis is not sufficient, and high-
light the essential importancc of the musical performnnce in order to hea,., 
unfolded in the music, Ihe idea exprcssed with words inthc text. 
In her article "Expectation and Anticipation as Key Elements for the 
Constitution of Meaning in Music", Elisa Negrcllo wonders what elemcnts of 
thc perceptive cxperience of music become morc relevant from the listener's 
point of view in order 10 assign mcaning to it. Thc articlc examines the de-
termination of meaning from a standpoint Ihal combincs phenomenology 
with the cognitivc psychology of music, through an analysis of the concepts 
of "expeclation" and "ant icipation". Both concepts refer to mental processes 
with diITercnt dcgrees of certainty: expectation refers to the cognitive ability 
of "prc-prcscnting" a future evellt which is not well defined, whercas antici-
pation refcrs to a "quasi-perception" of an cvent for which there is a high ex-
pectation. The authoress applies these concepts 10 the experience of musical 
perception and argues that both éêocÉKúsÉsI=which aim at fu ture evcnts in order 
to prepare the organism udequll tely to respond or aet before the cvents lake 
place, contributc to thc creation o r structural and meaning relat ions amongst 
the sounds. Likewise, she maintains that thc differences bctween both proc-
esses huve consequences in Ihe way an audicnce perceives music it is not fo-
milin!" wi th. [n this sense, the article concludes that expectation contri butes to 
the constitution of subjective mean ingful experiences and to the understand-
ing of the intentional movement Ihat helps thc audience to be conscious of a 
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sequence of sounds as full of musical meaning; whcrcns anticipation - which 
can be considered as a particular moment in the process of expectation - is 
the ability 10 have a menIal representation of a fu ture event that innucnccs 
how an audience understands music, and ul timately defines the difference be-
twccn understanding and fu iling to understand un fU 1l1i liar music. 
The essays by DANIEL QUESADA and MAR1A gosú=ALCAItAZ deal with 
questions concerning the nature of musical experience (e). In his m'ticle "M u-
sical Experience", Daniel Quesada raises the question whether there exists a 
specific type of experience that can be called musical experience. Stll11ing 
with the assumption that there are many types of musical experiences de· 
pcndi ng on Ill ulti ple elcments, Qucsada focuses his analysis on an ideal izcd 
notion or a 'pl/I'dy musical experience', all expericnce that only music can 
provide. Quesada enlightcns this notion with several examples taken rrom 
modem tonal music, and then examines the cond itions ror musical experience 
in 'pure' or ' absolute' musical works, on the one hand, and in works with 
representational content or programme music, on the other. With regard to 
the romler, he challenges the position or cCl1ain critics who describe the con· 
tent of a musical work in temlS or archetypes (e.g., work X enta ils suITering, 
work Y involves ilmer struggle, and so on), and argues that thc emotional 
propel1ies or the cvents involved in music arc non·specific and undetermined. 
Thi s is why, properly speaking, musical experiences canllot be described 
wi th IOllguage, but ra ther only alluded to. In this sense, he maintains that pos· 
session of inronnat ion about Cl composer or a musical work, or lack of it, is 
not decisive so as to dctennine the basic charactcr or a musica l experience. 
This argument ean also be Ilpplied to the cxperience or musical works with 
representationll l content. So, what can knowledge of the implicit content of a 
musical work contribule to musical experience? Quesada's response is that, 
when we listen to a musical work, that knowledge can callse in LIS an auditive 
or imaginative experience as ifwe were hearing or imagining somcthing de· 
terminate, although music callnot provide us with enough elements to deter· 
mine it. The ovel"lll1 conclusion or the Ilrtic1e is that pI/rely musical 
experiences cun be of different types, but the decisive point is tbat they all 
alike introduce characteristic types of indeterminacy. 
If Ihe aim of Quesada's article was to determine the conditions of a 
purely musica l experience, Maria Jose Alcaraz's essay "Music's Moral Char-
acter" raises un issue relating to the content of musical experience: is it pos· 
sible 10 chartlclerizc musical works - pm1 icuJarly, J"lUl"e or absolute music - in 
moral terms? TIle aim of the al1ic1e is to al·gue that there are grounds in musi· 
cal expelienee that not on ly allow, but also require, that churuclerization, und 
then 10 show that the understanding of this kind of content inrorms musical 
experience and strongly detennines the aesthet ic judgement or a musical 
work. Alcaraz analyzes possible objections 10 the latter claim, based on the 
lack of representacional content of pure music, and suggests that the moral 
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judgement of absolute music rests on the quality of its eltpressive content, 
specifically in the possibility to express something similar to a psychological 
a(tinlde or a character. An arguTllcnt in favour of this is that, just like some-
one can express herself through gestures, movements and behaviour without 
an intentional object, and these features can provide inrormation about her 
psychological profile, so Ihis kind of non-intentional expression ca n selVe as 
Cl model to take certain features that we perceive in a pieee of absolute music 
as expressions of a charar.;lt:r, lint! hence to judge or appreciate the expression 
as adequnte or inade(luate, not on ly in a psychological, but also in a moral 
sense (e.g., in lenns of sincerity, di stortion, alTogance, and so on). [n the last 
part of heT article, Alenraz argues for the claim thal it is constitutive of moral 
judgement nbout a particu lar musical work 10 recognize some kind of emo-
tionnl response demanded by the expressive character of the musicnl work, 
and stntes that moral descriptions of musical works have an impact on thcir 
aes'thetic valuc. 
Despite the variety of questions the last two articles of the volume deal 
with, they coincide in demanding wide perspectives in the philosophy of mu-
sic in order to tackle musica l events that arc beyond the borders of modem 
musical tradition. 
In his article "Los oidos prestados y el apeiroll sonoro. NOlflS para una 
Filosofia de la Mlisica", CESAR MORENO stands for the necessity of a phi-
losophy of music able to take care, ill a conceptual way, of what he ca lls ' the 
sonorous adventure of the 20th century", marked by a number of creations 
Ilnd proposals thal challenge the inherited cultural framework, which llsed to 
establish how !IIusic should be undcrstood. The al1iclc analizcs difTerent ex-
amples in that adventure, from the futurist vindication of noise - "the limi ted 
circle of pure sounds must be broken and the infinite variety of the 'noise-
sound' conquered" (Russolo) -to John Cage's proposal in his 4'33 work for 
listening to si lence as a plethora of possible sounds - listening with our 
thoughts, beyond Ollr cars -, nnd including Sehaeffer/l-Ienry's concrete music 
as well as a variety of proposals where the old walls sr.;parating tonality from 
atonality, sounds and noises, m1ificial and natural sounds are tore down 
(Stockhausen, Berio, Messiaen). Ccsar Moreno suggests that the sonorous 
adventure of the 20th century pnvcs the way for the "jump to Big Music", a 
non-institutionalized kind of music that emerges from what is unlimited 
(l/peiI'OIl), unpredictable and undetermined. Through the article, and espe-
cially at the cnd of it, the author explores the adequacy of certain philosoph i-
ca l concepts taken fj'Om Heideggcr and Derrida - and from Husserl 's 
phenomenology, too - in order to conceptualize that 'sonorous apeiron'. 
/\ common feature of all the articles presellled so far is that they illus-
trate their respective analysis with examples taken JJ'ol1lthe musical tradition 
of the West. The last essay included in thi s special issue of teOl'ellla enriches 
it with n look outside thal tradition - namely, the philosophy of music of 
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classical Confucianism. The overall aim of JAMES GARRISON'S article "The 
Socilt l Vuluc o f Ritual and Music in Classical Chinese Thoughl" is 10 show 
Ihe dose C(J!mcClion Ihat the philosophy of classical Confucian ism estab-
lishes between the sod,,] and ritual nature of music, with its rhythms and 
repetitions. This connection reinforces the celllrai role arthe body in Chinese 
music and proves that its social value does not rest simply in its being a so-
cial product, but in that it socializes those people that take part in il. A re-
markable aspect of the article is its attempt to draw simi larities between 
Confucianism and cCliain Wcstcm perspectives on the philosophy of music 
(especially Adotno's and DeNora's), who have tried 10 articu late 11 morc 
comprehensive vision of thc social nature of music, including the possibility 
of body-oricnted sel f-cultivat ion through music and rite, 
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